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A community for the latest discussions about the cutting edge of crypto design, it's culture and significant crypto news. Decentralize everything. Check out our [Community Guidelines](https://relevant.community/crypto/post/6122269e61d1cd005a877277/62427d3ed587ad005b647828)
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Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Andrew Hall explores how we might best reward informed participation in decentralized governance, rather than participation for activity’s sake. The first question, then, is whether we can incentivize informed voting by incentivizing voting with a majority. The authors believe this is unlikely due to this method’s cost, context requirements, and potential for coordination failure. Instead, the duo explores a more complex model for rewarding informed participation that alleviates many of these drawbacks. For projects that think the basic rewards mechanism is too vulnerable to gaming or uninformed voting, a logical way to start, according to this piece, is by only offering rewards to addresses with some kind of track record of contributions to the project. This would be in line with recent experiments in retroactive rewards, such as Optimism’s ongoing work. This is a fantastic analysis that is surely worth your time.
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Andrew Hall explores how we might best reward informed participation in decentralized governance, rather than participation for activity’s sake. The first question, then, is whether we can incentivize informed voting by incentivizing voting with a majority. The authors believe this is unlikely due to this method’s cost, context requirements, and potential for coordination failure. Instead, the duo explores a more complex model for rewarding informed participation that alleviates many of these drawbacks. For projects that think the basic rewards mechanism is too vulnerable to gaming or uninformed voting, a logical way to start, according to this piece, is by only offering rewards to addresses with some kind of track record of contributions to the project. This would be in line with recent experiments in retroactive rewards, such as Optimism’s ongoing work. This is a fantastic analysis that is surely worth your time.
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